In Antwort auf: Das Leiden der Menschen an Ihrer Ohnmacht." Was ist die Konsequenz aus diesem Leiden? Hier scheint die Philosophie gefragt zu sein und darüber weiss ich leider (noch) zu wenig. Vielleicht kann mir jemand aus der "philosophischen Ecke" des Boards ein paar verständliche Worte dazu als weiteren Anstoss posten.
Dear Ton
LOL, I am not concerned with Gerhart Hauptman´s style of prosa but presumably I can show you a linkage between philosophy and literature. In the nineteenth century, with the beginning of what Rorty calls the culture of the man of letters, that is the culture of the "intellectual who wrote poems and novels and political treatises, and criticisms of other people's poems and novels and treatises", the importance of philosophy began to be doubted. Writers like Proust - remain in their writings in relation to their own, private, idiosyncratic past, rewinding objects, people and events (using, for instance, that memoire involontaire), making redescriptions of their surrounding in their own vocabulary, in their own terms. They aim at autonomy, redescribing in their works those who once described themselves. They free themselves from foreign authorities, showing their relativity, their finiteness, their transitoriness.
Consequently, scientists became isolated at the beginning of the twentieth century from the majority of intellectuals, just like theologians had been isolated before. Poets and novelists became, to use Rorty's favorite formulation, the moral teachers of the youth, and the more philosophy wanted to be "scientific" or "exact", the more it drifted away from the rest of culture and thereby the more absurd became its traditional claims to being a foundational discipline for the whole of culture. The point is not that the philosopher has to write about literature; instead, the point may be that he re-thinks the very knot of relations between philosophy and literature. It is sometimes not the investigation of how philosophy approaches its "object" and "sharpens" its philosophical "tools" (Hegel) that lies at the heart of the question; it may also lie in the relations between the two.
In the face of the restricted influence of philosophy in general on delicate matters of social life in a time of the collapse of the traditional Enlightenment figure of the intellectual, the chance, perhaps the last chance, of shaping liberal sensitivity is provided by the novel (and let us bear in mind that we belong to a culture that was not only nourished by the "Bible, Socrates, Plato, and the Enlightenment" but also, as Rorty says, by "Rabelais, Montaigne, Sterne, Hogarth and Mark Twain").
regards
Blue ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
In Antwort auf: Dennoch wird es mir nicht klar, warum dieses Axiom so bedeutend bei der Programmierung der "determinated machines" ist. Was würde passieren, wenn man das Axiom vernachlässigen würde? Bislang scheint es nicht so, als ob die Funktionalität der Maschinen beeinträchtigt werden würde.
Principia Cybernetica philosophy is evolutionary: systems and their cybernetical organization are constructed through the self-organizing process of blind variation and natural selection. This process function as a skeleton interconnecting all principles. I will be doing my utmost to assess existing principles, clarifying their meaning, on the other hand try to formulate new principles which may generalize or interconnect known laws. The ultimate goal is to arrive at a network of concepts and principles similar to a formal system, with "axioms" implicitly defining primitive concepts, definitions of higher order concepts, and "theorems", derived from the more primitive axioms and definitions. The fundamental principles, like all good axioms, are supposed to be self-evident, if not tautologous. Their implications, like most theorems, on the other hand, may be far from trivial, and sometimes even counter-intuitive.
Actually on of it is called "The Principle of Asymmetric Transitions"(entropy and energy) A transition from an unstable configuration to a stable one is possible, but the converse is not. This principle implies a fundamental asymmetry in evolution: one direction of change (from unstable to stable) is more likely than the opposite direction. The generalized, "continuous" version of the principle is the following: The probability of transition from a less stable configuration A to a more stable one B is larger than the probability for the inverse transition: P (A -> B) > P (B -> A) (under the condition P (A -> B) =/ 0) A similar principle was proposed by Ashby in his Principles of the Self-Organizing System (1962):"We start with the fact that systems in general go to equilibrium. Now most of a system's states are non- equilibrial [...] So in going from any state to one of the equilibria, the system is going from a larger number of states to a smaller. In this way, it is performing a selection, in the purely objective sense that it rejects some states, by leaving them, and retains some other state, by sticking to it. " This reduction in the number of reachable states signifies that the variety, and hence the statistical entropy, of the system diminishes. It is because of this increase in neguentropy or organization that Ashby calls the process self-organization. But how does this fit in with the 2nd law of thermodynamics, which states that entropy in closed systems cannot decrease? The easy way out is to conclude that such a self-organizing system cannot be closed, and must lose entropy to its environment (von Foerster, 1960). A deeper understanding can be reached by going back from the statistical definition of entropy to the thermodynamic one, in terms of energy or heat. Energy is defined as the capacity to do work, and working means making changes, that is to say exerting variation. Hence energy can ve viewed as potential variation. A stable configuration does not undergo variation. In order to destroy a stable equilibrium, you need to add energy, and the more stable the configuration, the more energy you will need. Therefore stability is traditionally equated with minimal energy. The 1st law of thermodynamics states that energy is conserved. A naive interpretation of that law would conclude that the principle of asymmetric transitions cannot be valid, since it postulates a transition from an unstable (high energy) to a stable (low energy) configuration. If energy is absolutely conserved, then an unstable configuration can only be followed by another unstable configuration. This is the picture used in classical mechanics, where evolution is reversible, that is to say symmetric. Incidentally, this shows that the principle of asymmetric transitions is not tautological - though it may appear self-evident - , since a perfectly consistent theory (classical mechanics) can be built on its negation. Thermodynamics has enlarged that picture by allowing energy dissipation. But what happens with the "dissipated" energy? A simple model is provided by a quantum system (e.g. an electron bound in an atom) with its set of - usually discrete - energy levels. A configuration at a higher level will spontaneously fall down to a lower level, emitting a photon which carries the surplus energy away. In order to bring back the electron to its higher level, energy must be added by having a photon of the right energy and direction hit the electron, a rather improbable event. Hence, the low level can be viewed as a stable configuration, with a small probability of transition. The conjunction of energy conservation and asymmetric transitions implies that configurations will tend to dissipate energy (or heat) in order to move to a more stable state. For a closed system, this is equivalent to the thermodynamical interpretation of the 2nd law, but not to the statistical one, as the statistical entropy can decrease when transition probabilities are asymmetric. In an open system, on the other hand, where new energy is continuously added, the configuration will not be able to reach the minimum energy level. In that case we might assume that it will merely tend to maximally dissipate incoming energy, since transitions where energy is emitted are (much) more probable than transitions where energy is absorbed. That hypothesis seems equivalent to the Law of maximum entropy production (Swenson, 19), which describes dissipative structures and other far-from-equilibrium configurations. In such configurations the stability is dynamic, in the sense that what is maintained is not a static state but an invariant process. Such an application of the principle of asymmetric transitions is opposite to the most common interpretation of the 2nd law, namely that disorder and with it homogeneity tend to increase. In the present view, configurations tend to become more and more stable, emitting energy in the process. This might be seen as a growing differentiation between the negative energy of stable bonds, and the positive energy of photons and movement. Recent cosmological theories hypothesize a similar spontaneous separation of negative and positive energies to account for the creation of the universe out of a zero-energy vacuum (Hawking, 1988).
very warm regards,
Blue ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
Thema von BlueHorizon im Forum Antike Dichtungstheorien
Hello there
Here I explain my conception of metaphysics :
Metaphysics originally referred to Aristotle’s first philosophy because the books on this subject followed those on Physics. The following books became known as ta meta physika, “the ones after the Physics.” Kant reinterprets metaphysics according to a philosophy of experience; metaphysics becomes knowledge independent of sense experience. In the latest major formulation (or meta-narrative), Heidegger describes metaphysics as the history of the withdrawal of being, fro the time of Plato onwards, in favor of a merely scientific or utilitarian study of beings (of their essences and particulars). Heidegger holds that Nietzsche put an end to metaphysics and wishes to return philosophical thinking to its proper subject (what he calls fundamental thinking):being as the coming-forth of phenomena. To accomplish this, he refreshes philosophy’s dialogue with the Presocratics, whom he believes precede the inception of metaphysics. The Presocratics’ poetic conception of being, in which phenomena are described in their coming-to-be and passing-away, especially attracts him. As a substitute for the study of (See, for example, Detienne, M., The Daily Life of the Greek Gods; and Onians (1951). being according to categories, he emphasizes the phuo/phusis (natural growth) aspect of being in its disclosure in phenomena.) I define metaphysics in a somewhat new way, neither as a history of Being nor as theories about beings. Metaphysics is not only transcendence of nature, although it includes and requires transcendence. Metaphysics is a way of thinking that lays aside temporality in an attempt to evade mortality. Metaphysics is a pharmakon(potion) that purges our account of cosmos of the temporality that reminds us of our mortality. Thus the natural sciences, along with the dreams of the ghost-seer, history, logic, laws, cults, and religions, are all metaphysical. By metaphysical I mean: atemporal, non-mortal descriptions of reality, often referring to some atemporal or eternal foundation, whether in being, knowledge, method, or law. Thus metaphysics is nothing special; rather it is our most ordinary mode of being-in-the-world. I define as metaphysics any explanation that shares the atemporality of logos, especially the atemporality of laws (including grammar). Thus the natural sciences are metaphysical, epistemology is metaphysical, and finally, logic is metaphysical (categories, syllogisms, universals, symbols). And, under the terms of this definition, Nietzsche is correct in labeling as metaphysics the strains of other-worldliness in both Socrates and organized Christianity; furthermore, Heidegger is correct in labeling technology as metaphysical. Metaphysics is, in its essence, the flesh become logos, existence defined according to principles and laws. Both universals and particulars, in the traditional logical-ontological-theological senses, belong to the lexicon of metaphysics as defined in this way. Opposed to these is the phenomenon of the inescapable, radical individuality of each concrete, individual, life-trajectory from nativity (birth) to fatality (death). Metaphysics substitutes certainty, predictability, control, project, and method as ways of evading the epistemological impossibility of knowing our own death; hence the need for the anxiety induced by Socrates, to know that we do not know. We cannot eliminate or overcome metaphysics, any more than we can cure our mortality. However, given the pervasiveness and banality of metaphysics (in this sense), the task of philosophy becomes primarily ethical. Philosophy must not allow the fictions of metaphysics to obscure our mortality. The closest that traditional metaphysics comes to individuals is in assigning individuals proper names, such as “Adam,” “Reiner,” etc. However, these names, like labels, function more like common genera or species names such as“cat,” “dog, “tree,” etc. , in that they attribute a deceptive stasis to an individual that is essentially temporal. (Parmenides draws attention to the role of names and naming in a universe of phusis.) Proper names, though they may sometimes be unique, do not address individuals, any more than do social security numbers (which are always unique). They conceal living-and-dying individuals with symbols. How, then, do we restore individuals? In the next section, I discuss a view of radical individuality. First, I follow up the foregoing criticisms of metaphysics as static logoi with some words about myth as a cure, as an alternative means of embodying phusis in language. I do not use “myth” in the trivial sense of a falsehood or a “mere” story but in the original Greek sense of mythos as narrative. The poem of Parmenides and the dialogues of Plato are neither historically accurate nor capricious, nor are they intended to be only rhetorical tools or literary devices. Both are narrative forays into phusis. In this fundamental sense, these philosophers are myth-makers. We can therefore reject the standard picture of the evolution of philosophical thought as a move from muthos to logos. Myth has the advantage of moving away from the metaphysical obsession with truth towards representing phusis as individuals in the context of their life-worlds. Thus myth is not concerned with facts and entities that we may designate as “true” or “false”; instead, myth presents us with shapes of existence. Instead of certainty and its equally metaphysical concept of chaos, myth elegantly provides us with probabilistic (tuche,chance) and lucid accounts (as opposed to necessity—anangke, certainty and predictability). Of fundamental importance is myth’s power to preserve individuals (Achilles, Socrates) without factualizing them (“Where does Parmenides’ kouros travel?”; “Did Socrates really meet Parmenides?”). Myth preserves individuality through anecdote by focusing on the mortal life entangled in physis. Myth addresses this individuality by highlighting the individual’s thymos rather than his psyche.
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
Thema von BlueHorizon im Forum cybernetics, artificia...
Hi there
A determinate machine is defined as that which behaves in the same way as does a closed single-valued transformation. The justification is simply that the definition works— that it gives us what we want, and nowhere runs grossly counter to what we feel intuitively to be reasonable. The real justification does not consist of what is said in this section, but of what follows in the remainder of the book, and, perhaps, in further developments. It should be noticed that the definition refers to a way of behaving, not to a material thing. We are concerned in this book with those aspects of systems that are determinate—that follow regular and reproducible courses. It is the determinateness that we shall study, not the material substance. As a simple and typical example of a determinate machine, consider a heavy iron frame that contains a number of heavy beads joined to each other and to the frame by springs. If the circumstances are constant, and the beads are repeatedly forced to some defined position and then released, the beads’ movements will on each occasion be the same, i.e. follow the same path. The whole system, started at a given “state”, will thus repeatedly pass through the same succession of states.By a state of a system is meant any well-defined condition or property that can be recognised if it occurs again. Every system will naturally have many possible states.
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
In Antwort auf: Blue´s Kommentar im Wittgenstein- Thread läßt vermuten, dass wir zu wenig der Beziehung zwischen "Artificial Intelligence" und Philosophie Rechnung tragen.
In the past, philosophers had to take care of the whole chain of knowledge production, from raw data zo scientific theories, as it were. Throughout its history, philosophy has progressively identified classes of empirical and logico- mathematical problems and outsourced their investigations to new disciplines. It has then returned to these disciplines and their findings for controls, clarifications, constraints, methods, tools, and insights.But (Carnap 1935; Reichenbach 1951),philosophy itself consists of conceptual investigations whose essential nature is neither empirical nor logico-mathematical. To mis-papraphrase Hume:"If we take in our hand any volume, let us ask: Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?
I ´d love doing an AI discussion...
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
In Antwort auf: Glaube in diesem Sinne ist immer gebunden an ein Dogma. Man darf mit Recht daran zweifeln, daß die Griechen der homerischen Zeit überhaupt so etwas dogmengebundenen Glauben hatten. Bei Homer sind die Götter so natürlich so natürlich, so selbstverständlich, daß noch Herodot, als er Ägypten besuchte und dort in Kontakt mit einheimischen Götterkulten kam, diese Götter gleichsam ins Griechische "übersetzte".
Dear Nauplios, It has been noted that the Greeks were concerned with absolutes, with primary causes and abstract notions of 'form' that previous thinkers had simply not considered. As Guthrie states, “The Egyptian and Mesopotamian peoples ... felt no interest in knowledge for its own sake, but only in so far as it served a practical purpose” [Guthrie, WKC (1978), The earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans, CUP, Cambridge.] It was the Greeks 'fundamentally different way of looking at the world that was to be the gateway to philosophy. Philosophy did not however, come into being of its own accord. It could be argued that the underlying philosophy of a 'first cause' was existent and moreover intentional in the early myths of Orpheus. Athenagoras claims that “Orpheus was the first theologian”[Athenagoras; Orpheus fragment 13 in Freeman: 3Freeman, K (1996), Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Harvard, USA,]but it is worthy of note that even then, Orpheus is attributed with making claims about the first elements, Water and Earth, and there is a strong suggestion of the elemental nature of the divinities. Damascius makes reference to the theology of Orpheus, and from this we see that it was centred on Time, Necessity, Chaos, Aether and a host of other deified elements. The overriding factor in this, however, is the fact that deity had a definite presence. If theological myth evolved as a way of transmitting philosophical thought, it seems at worst pointlessly cryptographic, and at best inefficiently executed. There is however a discernible evolution of Greek thought, whose roots in Orphic theogyny continue with Homer's myths, in which the gods have ultimate power over humans, though rarely directly exercised. It is debatable whether Homer's view is typical of early Mycenean Greece, or whether it was a reflection of the 'Dark Age' of Greek history. In the case of Homer, Kirk & Raven clearly believe there to be at best limited philosophical merit, as they state “almost nothing in Homer ... can reasonably be construed as specifically cosmogonical or cosmological”.[Kirk & Raven (1960), The Presocratic Philosophers, CUP, Cambridge] In either case, both Orpheus and Homer clearly highlight the importance of the gods in Greek culture from an early date. The significance of this, if one does not assume an intentional philosophical meaning, only becomes clear when considering that the religious explanation would seem by far the most natural and probable, in comparison to the later philosophical view of the world.
regards,
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
Wittgenstein traces out a project that bears some striking family resemblances to Gertrude Stein's insistently grammatical investigations of poetry and prose. The works of both writers are informed by a fundamental question: What is it in language that has the power to make us?
Dear NID, Nauplios & Temp David Gooding (University of Bath) notes that “the Tractatus was modelled on Hertz’ Principles of Mechanics. Hertz believed that his book would be a full and final statement of the principles of mechanics; Wittgenstein thought that Frege, Russel and Whithead had done the same for mathematics and that he would do the same for language.”
The rich and extensive use of metaphor suggests that emotional resonance and association to a commonly understood situation can be employed to trigger what, to the author of the description, is his “accurate” emotional response to a piece of music. Communication, in this case, will depend mostly upon our shared humanity, sometimes upon our personal experiences but, unlike computers, little upon any referential semantics. The implications of such observations on the communication of internal experience are radical. They have led us to take Wittgenstein’s Tractatus [Wittgenstein 1921] as a paradigmatic description of the current state of computer science. We can take this step because the Church-Turing Thesis shows that the Turing Machine (the classical computer) is equivalent to Lambda calculus and recursive functions. Lambda calculus and recursive functions together form the description of a functional programming language (e.g. ML). Such a functional language embodies Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. This early work encapsulated a formal and logical representational schema into a descriptive form that was based upon denotational (or referential) semantics. In this case, the referents (the objects) have some logically strange properties. Objects must be:
• independent in that they can freely combine to form “states of affairs” that can be described • atomic in that there are no smaller constituents (T2.02, T2.021) • in all possible worlds • immaterial • indescribable except by their behaviour (form) • self governed in that they have their own internal rules of behaviour
These referents (objects) are intended to be more than just elements of description; they form the real world. From these referents, the full force of logic, predicate and propositional calculus retains stability of meaning and sense. Such a stance results in the position that everything is potentially unambiguously describable. introduce here the idea of a ‘rational’ set3. A ‘rational’ set is a set where there is a finite set of rules that can include unambiguously any member of that set and unambiguously excludes any non-member of that set (see also the definition of irrational sets – section Paradigm Leap). It should be noted that all the sets referenced by the Tractatus are rational where set membership is always specifiable and context independent or has an explicit context that is also rational. The Tractatus provides an extensive model of computer languages. The argument is that names (in practice signs; the visible part of an expression or name) in propositions do not always refer to primitive objects but are themselves referencing propositions and further discussed in P43-60 [Wittgenstein 1953] ). These, in turn, are complexes that finally end up as compound statements whose ultimate referent is the bit. Here the bit is the mechanical equivalent of Wittgenstein’s referent objects. The bit, if taken as a detectable distinction, has all the strange properties of Wittgenstein’s object. Further, it is at the bit that the program links to the world and has meaning. It is this meaning that allows the program to have “sense” with respect to the computer. This formal semantics and the ability for programmers to create procedures and sub-routines (sub-propositions or expressions) is the primary characteristic of all high level and assembler programming languages.
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
In Antwort auf: Ist die Sprache der Natur stumm, so trachtet Kunst, das Stumme zum Sprechen zu bringen. Da Natur selbst sprechen will, springt die Kunst ihr nur bei, indem sie den Dingen zur Sprache verhilft; Kunst möchte mit menschlichen Mitteln das Sprechen des Nicht - Menschlichen realisieren. In dieser, zugegeben metaphysischen, Vorstellung mischt sich das Grauen vor dem Schweigen der Natur mit der Erfahrung, daß sie völlig eben doch nicht schweigt. Sehr entschieden führt Adorno den künstlerischen Ausdruck auf das Leiden zurück. Es ist der Ausdruck, durch den die nicht - ästhetische Erfahrung am tiefsten in die Gebilde [der Kunst] hineinreicht.
Dear Temp, Metaphysiker and Duns The difference between Plato and his most famous student turns on their contrasting accounts of the nature and location of universals, and on corresponding differences in their theories of knowledge and representation. The Plato-Aristotle debate in its many versions lasted until the nineteenth century, when new theories of art as expression transformed the ways in which truth is attributed to art. Now the most forceful advocates of “artistic truth” would link it with creativity, imagination, and the expression of that which exceeds the grasp of ordinary or scientific understanding. One glimpses this new tendency in Immanuel Kant’s account of artistic “genius” as an imaginative capacity for expressing “aesthetic ideas.” Yet Kant would have rejected romantic claims that art’s imaginative character makes it a “higher” source of truth than are science and bourgeois morality – a higher source alongside philosophy and religion, in G. W. F. Hegel’s account of “absolute spirit.”The debate shifts once more with the so-called linguistic turn in twentiethcentury philosophy. Although many traces remain of both pre-Kantian accounts of representation and post-Kantian emphases on expression, a philosophy whose head is linguistically turned cannot easily posit direct connections either between (representational) art and reality or between (expressive) art and the inner self. Increasingly, the questions whether art can carry truth, and whether this capacity or its lack is crucial to art, get posed in one of two ways: (1) Can arts-related language (commentary, criticism, historiography, and the like) be true or false? (2) Are the arts themselves languages, such that, depending on one’s theory of language, the arts lack or possess truth capacities in the way that languages do?
warm regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
Hugh Dixon obtained M.Mus.(hons) from the University of Auckland in 1968, studied science and music at Victoria University of Wellington and music at Canterbury University of Christchurch before moving to Auckland where he has lived most of his life. He obtained a Diploma of Teaching from Wellington Teachers' College (1950). His career has spanned a wide range of music teaching, in particular, brass instruments. It also embraced teaching general science in secondary schools. For a period of 18 years he taught brass instruments and music theory privately.For seven years, Hugh was trumpet player in The Symphonia of Auckland (now Auckland Philharmonia).
It´s a romantic piece of music, Temp - just tried it.
warm regards,
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
Hello across the ocean, Temp & Metaphysiker - great to have you with us , LOL NID you don´t expect Metaphysiker writing English, do you? .
Rorty finds much of Davidson’s theory of meaning, in addition to his theory of metaphor, a useful supplement to pragmatism. Turning to Davidson’s theory of metaphor, the operative feature of his positive theory is that for him metaphor is relevant to the area of pragmatics rather than the semantics of a language. Metaphor, then, is a function of the use of words and sentences, and this use depends entirely on the literal (Davidson uses the unloaded term “ordinary”) meanings of the words used. What makes Davidson’s view unique is what he denies in the traditional accounts, and yet what he simultaneously retains concerning the importance of metaphor.
warm regards across the ocean
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
Nach wie vor ist unser Bild von der Welt körperzentriert. Wir betrachten als Realität, was nicht zu einem, sondern zu allen unseren Sinnen spricht, und wir setzen die Synästhesie ein, um die Einzelwahrnehmungen wechselseitig zu kontrollieren. Unser Körper fungiert als Ort der Synthesis,als letztes Kriterium, letzte Instanz, sowohl in der naturwissenschaftlichen Beobachtung,im Labor, als auch in der Alltagsorientierung.Gleichzeitig aber nötigen uns die Zeichen, immer mehr Tatsachen zur Kenntnis zu nehmen, die körperlich nicht zu verifizieren sind, und die dennoch Realitätscharakter beanspruchen. Wenn Zeichen - immer Post - immer von Entferntem berichten, und kulturelle Wissensbestände verdichtet dem einzelnen zur Verfügung stellen, dann verschiebt sich die Frage nach der Derealisierung auf das Verhältnis der individuellen Wahrnehmung zu den kollektiven Wissensbeständen, mit der Besonderheit eben, daß nur die erstere auf den Körper zentriert ist.
Our view of the world continues to be body-centred. We view as >reality< that which addresses not just one, but all, of our senses, and we deploy synaesthesia to reciprocally monitor the individual perceptions.Our body functions as a place of synthesis, as the final criterion, final authority, both in scientific observation under laboratory conditions and in everyday orientation. Yet at the same time the signs are forcing us to take notice of ever more facts which are physically unverifiable but nevertheless claim the character of reality. If signs - invariably items of post - always report on the remote, and place at the individual's disposal compressed items of cultural knowledge, then the question about derealization shifts to the relationship of individual perception to the collective stocks of knowledge, with the peculiarity that of these two, only the former is centred on the body.
warm regards
Blue ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
Why do you need a translation "group" for that? Temp explained nearly 2 months ago that this phase won´t last forever. She did an excellent job. So why do you need to bother her again? Can´t you push buttons? Can´t you make plans? Time to ring some changes LOL. If you are interested in contributing to the Rorty - Thread you are welcome We won´t mind you writing German and certainly we won´t bother Temp with exaggerated translations . I have read the history of the Nietzsche - Thread when NID was getting outnumbered - those dark days are gone!!! Temp was the one and only who cared and survived in style all the implications. She did her utmost in bridging the intercontinental "gap". Nauplios and Metaphysiker are easy to talk to. They are translating postings or giving answers to certain questions.
Dear Temp
Good to see you online today. People will never forget how you make them feel.
Anything you write is so familiar. NID and I are relying on our conversation with you. We are strongly (metaphysically?) interested in "talking" philosophy, music and poetry. Relating to our working schedules we can´t take part into learning Greek. But we will keep you in mind .
I will upload a song for you at podcaster. Still thinking of a slow ballad - a song of joy and hope putting your mind at ease.
warm regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
Guess we had to recall that Rorty is pursuing a nonteleological account of intellectual history which relies on Davidson’s claim that metaphors have no meaning beyond the literal. Rorty thinks such a view of metaphor will let us see intellectual change as contingent and nonteleological. He says that metaphors stand outside the limits of “regular, predictable linguistic behavior.”As such they have no place in any current “language game,” because “to have a meaning is to have a place in a language game. Metaphors, by definition, do not.” Since they have no place in a language game, metaphors fit with no established pattern of justification; they stand outside these patterns and cause us to create new patterns of justification. This results from the fact that though, as Davidson says, they cause lots of effects in the reader or listener, they do not represent anything. They stand for no facts or ideas.
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
In Antwort auf: Doch bei aller nun dargestellten negativen Auffassung des Fortschritts erkennen Adorno und Horkheimer auch durchaus dessen befreiendes Potential: Objektive Begriffe implizieren auch immer schon eine Kritik von Herrschaft und eröffnen eine universale Perspektive, die Verwirklichung des Denkens und damit zugleich seine Versöhnung. Dadurch, daß der gesellschaftliche Zustand immer absurder wird, wird die Vernunft selbst von den Herrschenden als Ideologie denunziert. Dagegen wird Aufklärung zum Instrument der Befreiung, indem sie Herrschaft als solche anerkennt und erklärt.
Dear Temp and Metaphysiker
“We do not stand by everything we said,” Adorno and Horkheimer wrote in the 1969 preface to Dialectic of Enlightenment. “That would be incompatible with a theory which attributes a temporal core to truth instead of contrasting truth as something invariable to the movement of history”. This statement laconically expresses the difficulty of anthologizing Adorno’s writings: the mere selection is initially complicated by the emphatically historical kernel of the themes discussed by Adorno, while the fact that his collected, published work “comprises more than ten thousand pages, of which more than four thousand concern music” (Leppert 13) further compounds the problem. To untangle it one needs a sound understanding of Adornos´ thoughts.
While high modernism moves away from depictions of life and political themes, the avant-garde reconnects society with the very things modernism avoids. Despite the conflict between the two, modernism converges with the avant-garde for brief moments, which brings about positive social change. Modernity, in its push for globalization and standardization, moves towards absolutes. However, this creates a “broken connection between our culture and our lives” (Berman 42). In the attempt to reconcile life with the directions modern society moves in, the avant-garde creates novel art as a reaction against this incompatibility. Always seeking to move toward the newest and most modern plateau, modernism then appropriates the new ideas, and adapts them to its own ends. However, as soon as the industry discovers the new art form, it is appropriated and becomes part of modern society (Adorno 132). The resolution arises from the dialectic of modernism.
regards Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
I entered the website of your audio blog and was amazed by listening to Temp´s and Nauplios´ audio files. I am doing a lot of midi recordings and less real audio.So you are doing great .
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
In Antwort auf:Grundlegende Begriffe von Adornos negativer Dialektik sind Identität bzw Nicht-Identität. Was Identität dabei meint, ist schwer zu rekonstruieren, da Adorno sie in mehrfacher Hinsicht bestimmt hat. Die gewichtigste Bestimmung von Identität scheint die Übereinstimmung zwischen Begriff und Sache zu sein, aber auch einfachere Bestimmung wie die logische Identität.Adorno betrachtet mit Marx die Hegelschen Kategorien jedoch auch unter dem Gesichtspunkt einer materialistischen Kritik. Seine Kritik der Identität wäre philosophisch interessant, jedoch recht folgenlos, wenn er nicht nachweisen würde, daß die Form der Gesellschaft, hier vor allem der Warentausch und die Herrschaft, die Identität des Subjekts mit sich selbst erst produzieren. Diese macht er mit Fichte zu der Grundlage des Identitätsprinzips überhaupt.
I´m still questioning Nicht-Identity. How can we argue that a person is identical and non- identical. Shouldn´t we measure an individuum by his actions and reactions. Identity is a little too fragile to maintain and the negation of it is to put into question - how can a person fight for freedom if his or her identity is negated??
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
In Antwort auf: Das Lebenswerk des Verstorbenen wird besprochen und man wundert sich, wie aus einem erzkonservativen Katholiken, der Bezwinger des Kommunismus wird. Selbst Frauen beginnen zu verstehen wie die Dogmatik der unbefleckten Empfängnis und ihre eigene Unfähigkeit zum Priesteramt sich durch tiefere und tiefste theologische Interpretation der Vernunft erschließt. Letzlich hat die katholische Kirche "bereits" 1966 Immanuel Kant vom Index genommen. Langsam finden wir zu der Erkenntnis, das die Mandarine des Vatikan den weiblichen Körper doch grundlegender verstanden haben als andere und erst recht als Frauen selbst. Wen wunderts, das man ihnen jetzt die Entscheidungskompetenz in Fragen der Abtreibung nicht mehr länger abstreiten kann?
The Pope did support solidarnosc!!! Without him Lech Walechsa wouldn´t had any chance to rebuild democratical change from within. One shouldn´t concentrate too much on how our TV shows - esp. that "lousy" comments on CNN did make it a big event lol. It´s pretty obvious at least for roman catholics all over the world to mourn the death of their greatest spiritual leader. The mourning of the Pope lasts for nine days. This period is called "Novendiales". The first day of the nine is the day the Pope dies. On each of the days, when a Cardinal holds Mass, it must be a funeral Mass for the Pope. Before the Pope is buried, the public can pay their last respects in St. Peter's Basilica. On the fifth, sixth, or seventh day, there is a solemn funeral in the St. Peter's Basilica, celebrated by the Cardinals and the Dean of the College of Cardinals. The Pope is buried in the Crypt of St. Peter's Basilica, and the mourning of his death continues for the remainder of the nine days.
Well ,I´m agnostic but I respect everyone for his or her beliefs
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
I put the rows to your Berg title. Hope that will make everything more obvious. But one of the mayor problem occurs that they can´t be displayed properly - lol .So you gotta sort them out anyway.
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
The first setting had been composed in 1907 and dedicated to Helene Nahowski, Berg's then-future wife. The second setting was new and officially dedicated to the UE anniversary. The 1925 setting was Berg's first compostion employing the twelve-tone system. It reveals many of the unique characteristics of Berg's twelve-tone method; these would be important for the remainder of his compositions. The principal row, or set, of the work is the symmetrical all-interval series:
P(0): 0 11 7 4 2 9 3 8 10 1 5 6
intervals: 1 4 3 2 5 6 5 2 3 4 1
The second line shows the intervals between adjacent tones in the row. As can be seen, the intervals of the first half (1 4 3 2 5) are reversed in the second half (5 2 3 4 1). Because of this, there are 24, rather than 48, possible row transformations: every retrograde of the row has an exact twin that is prime, and every retrograde inversion has a twin that is only inverted. Berg employs cyclic permutation of the row to obtain a row in which the two hexachords of the original have been exchanged:
The boundary elements of the hexachords (5,2;8,11 in 1-P(5)) are exploited as a means of associating different row-forms:
Schlies-se mir die Au-gen bei-de mit den lie-ben Han-den zu; 5 4 0 9 7 2 8 1 3 6 10 11 5 4 0 geht doch al-les was ich lei-de, un-ter dei-ner Hand zur Ruh. 9 7 2 8 1 3 6 10 11 5 4 0 9 7 2
Und wie lei-se sich der Schmerz Well um Wel-le schla-fen le-get 2-P(5): 813 6 10 11 5 4 0 9 7 2 8 1 3 wie der letz-te Schlag sich re-get, ful-lest du mein gan-zes Herz. 6 10 11 5 4 0 9 7 2 8 1 3 6 10 11
The work has a two-part structure: it is 20 measures long, with each half of the poem taking 10. Each syllable of the text recieves, in the vocal setting, one tone from the row. Because there are 30 syllables in the first half of the poem, the second half begins on the 7th tone of 1-P(5), g# or 8. Thus, the second half of the vocal setting begins with 2-P(5). The piano was assigned this row form at the beginning, and is now assigned 1-P(5). Thus, the piano and the voice employ rows with exchanged hexachords at the start of each section of the work. Notice, in the above, that if the vocal part were to continue, it would employ the set 1-P(5). Thus, the song has a circular form: the last notes of the vocal setting bring us back to the moment just before the start of the piece. Twelve-tone simultaneities, where all 12 tones of the chromatic scale sound at the same time, occur at the end of each section. In measures 11-15 "employment of a set form and a procedure that do not occur elsewhere differentiates these five bars from the remainder of the piece, clarifying the binary design and giving emphasis to the recapitulatory function of the five bars that follow" (Perle 1985: 9). The pairing by Berg of this advanced twelve-tone work with a simplistic tonal work, with both works being settings of the same poem, acts as a demonstration of the musical evolution that occurred in music during the 25 years of Universal Edition's existence. The 1925 setting of "Schliesse mir die Augen beide" is in many respects a preparatory study for the Lyric Suite. The principal series in the song is the same as that of the first movement of the quartet. The boundary (first and last) pitches of this series are F and B, or in German notation, F and H. Berg had come in contact with Hanna Fuchs-Robettin, the sister-in-law of one of the Berg's closest friends, Alma Mahler Werfel, when staying as a house guest with the Fuchs-Robettin family. Hanna's initials are the boundary pitches of the above-mentioned series. In the two 12-tone simultaneities in the song, the same two pitches are the highest and lowest notes. Finally, Hanna's number, 10, determines the length of the sections and, by consequence the entire piece.
regards
Blue
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The existence of truth only becomes an issue when another sort of truth is in question. (R.Rorty)
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09.06.2005 17:23
in style all the implications. She did her utmost in bridging the intercontinental "gap".
.It won´t work LOL - 
